Yemen Military - The Yemeni army no longer exists, it has been replaced by several militias, sometimes organized: only the federal-based reform of the security sector can prevent the growth of the regional power of the leaders value. A survey conducted by the Yemen Polling Center in 2017 sheds more light on this situation: "Who will bring security to this region?" In the question, only 16% of Yemenis across the country are "policemen/guards" [1] .
Yemen is not a Westphalian state with limited territorial boundaries and a specific authority. On the other hand, Yemen today is often described as a "failed state" or, according to serious security considerations, as consisting of a "security arrangement" that includes coexistence, competition, and the cooperation of the state and non-state armed forces. But the conflict in 2015 definitely changed this unified framework.
Yemen Military
For many years, the Yemeni army was a collection of tribal militias, without professionalism and unity of authority, or general oversight of security issues. In terms of defense, Shuyuk was more important than the generals. While the army's main mission was to protect the regime, the military balance reflected the regime: personnel from Hashid's army continued and the Sanhan family filled the ranks. After 1994, southerners were excluded from the defense sector.
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In the history of Yemen, the establishment of institutions has represented a good defense strategy, as shown by the presidency of Ali Abdullah Saleh. Special forces and tribal forces were assembled by the administration, initially to balance the regular army. The armed forces, deeply affected by corruption (spiritual soldiers), are a source of prosperity (jobs) and support (successful) for Yemenis: the "tribal-military-business complex" is a pillar of power strength and power of Saleh [2]. ].
Since 2012, the Security Sector Reform (SSR) engineered by interim President Abd-Rabbu Mansour Hadi has paved the way for the fall of the transitional government. At first, it was marked by a change of leadership, change and dissolution of powerful organizations such as the Republican Guard and the 1st Regional Army Command, led by Ali Mohsin al-Ahmar. But Hadi also reflected the bad behavior of the past: he joined 20,000 loyal men from the Islah party (including the Muslim Brotherhood and Salafis), moved officials from his own Abyan region[3] and appointed his son Nasser Hadi. The new president is the head of the defense ministry.
When the conflict broke out in 2015, the military collapsed. As a result, part of the army remained loyal to the international organizations, while the other - at the time it was tied to President Saleh before - joined the rebels. The Houthis gained military control until they controlled 60-70% of the military's arsenal before the war: Ansarullah was able to enter and control Saleh's military units, but it also created new and enforced institutions. "Popular section".
Many anti-Houthi forces are also fighting: this is the case of the popular groups that support Hadi. These groups, based in Abyan, receive salaries and subsidies from the government. In Taiz, the Salafi Al-Abbas Brigade was able to control the Houthi resistance. The United Arab Emirates (UAE) has organized, trained and equipped several regional militias in South Yemen (including the former PDRY, Salafis, and separatists) to secure the recovered areas and fight against jihadist activities and participation. Among these forces, better paid and armed than the Yemeni army, the Security Belt Forces (or Al-Hissam Brigades, over 15.000 soldiers) were stationed in Aden , Abyan and Lahij; Local armies were formed in Hadhramad, Shabwa (up to 4000 soldiers) and possibly Mahra. The local tribes are not associated with the main groups in addition to the map of the armed groups of Yemen.
History Of Conflict In Yemen
What is interesting - and worrying at the same time - is that militias have become the "new normal" in Yemen's current war situation, where they act as agents of unstable, but they represent stability in the SSR. A special look at conflict areas such as Aden and Hadramaut makes this clear: the people who provide protection are, at the same time, the people who are not safe [4], and contribute to marginalization the rehabilitation of the military. In Aden, the Security Belt Forces have been under the authority of the Ministry of Interior since 2016, but the regional group is a special unit of the Yemeni Army.
However, the UAE finances and trains militias that do not work within the legal umbrella, as confirmed by the UN expert panel: "while being consistent with a reasonable government", these groups "are normal then act outside of his authority [5]", answered correctly. Emirates. In January 2018, the pro-separatist and UAE-backed Southern Transitional Council (STC), the third Yemeni government, established its military wing, the Southern Resistance Forces, the security belt and local units of the Yafi Federation.
Deactivation, deactivation, reactivation (DDR) and SSR must rely on the same local authority as the trust methods. But in the areas controlled by special organizations, especially during the conflict in the south of Yemen (Aden, Shabwa, Hadramaut), the SSR has appeared without the DDR, and it is led by the UAE. As a result, these activists, in many cases inspired by the causes of separatism, have turned into organizations, although they continue to behave like unorganized organizations. These kinds of violent attacks promote what Albrecht called the "militarization of security regimes [6]" and cannot build a foundation for the colonial state.
Today, the military reform in Yemen cannot be carried out effectively without addressing two interrelated problems: the growth of Salafi cases and the importance of foreign support.
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In fact, this type of SSR has strengthened the military Salafists, giving legitimacy to the militarization of the Salafist trend: which will be a major challenge for Yemen after the conflict. The war in 2015 renewed Yemen's Islamic politics, blurring the lines between the Muslim Brotherhood (which is now discredited), Salafis and jihadists. "Peaceful/apolitical Salafis" were often replaced by "activist Salafis": in some cases, political forces forced militarization, and water in the jihadi galaxy led to the spread of a new anti-Shia sectarian .[7]
In addition, the Salafi issue is increasingly linked to international support. The United Arab Emirates and, to a lesser extent, Saudi Arabia have invested financially, politically and militarily in the Salafi armed groups of Yemen: these forces have no incentive to encourage a peace process, especially if the demands of the southern separatists are not met. . In a prophecy that has come true, Ansarullah is now receiving military support from Iran[8] and increasing ties with Shia networks.
In this case, what kind of security regime for Yemen? Looking at the headquarters of the seven armed forces established by the 2012 SSR, they all have different political affiliations: Sayyun (Wadi Hadhramat, pro-Sale fighter and Saudi influence), Mukalla (coastal Hadhramat, Emirati-backed forces), Mareb (General). Ali Mohsin, Islah, Saudi influence ), Aden (separatists and pro-Emirati), Hodeidah (Houthis), Amran (Houthis), Tamar (Houthis). This complex politico-military landscape can further escalate into conflict (prolonged war) or federalism, which seeks internal security agreements.
As for the federal structure, the establishment of the Yemeni National Guard can be a way to rebuild a cleaner but more effective military than before to reduce the centrifugal effect of regional organizations. The National Guard consists of local partners, coalition (Houthi, al-Hirak) and independent politicians, on a regional basis. All security personnel must be paid and trained by the central government: this is the only way to restore law in the state. Clearly, the reform of the defense sector must be linked to a comprehensive political agreement between the parties involved. Otherwise, the warlordism [9] will certainly not only military relations but also the geography of the territory of Yemen.
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, London, pp.33-55; Adam C. Seitz, "Political Support in Transition: The Politics and Economy of the Yemeni Armed Forces", in LK Gravert-Zeynab Abul-Maqd (eds),
5. United Nations Security Council, Final Report of the Panel of Experts on Yemen (S/2017/81), 31 January 2017, p. 18.
6. Albrecht Holger, "Cain and Abel in the Land of Sheba: High Conflict and War", in Holger Albrecht-Aral Croissant-Fred H. Lawson (eds),
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7. Laurent Bonfoy, "Sunni Islamist Dynamics in the Context of War: What Happened to Al-Isla and the Salafis?" and Elizabeth Kendall, "The Impact of the Yemen War on the Military Jihad", p
8. United Nations Security Council, Final Report of the Panel of Experts on Yemen, 26 January 2018, S/2018/68.
9. According to Seitz, warlordism is a group of "military leaders and/or tribal leaders" who "exercise local or regional political power through the control of military units and militia". Marie-Christine Heinze, Adam C. in Yemen. Seids—perhaps the most unusual situation in the Arab world—have never been able to develop a national army, the most important, cooperative, and effective political organization. Understanding and explaining the inability of the Yemeni state to build a unified military is one of the main causes of instability in the past and present in Yemen, this is a new report.
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